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We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that
no agent should be able to bene¯t by augmenting his endowment
through borrowing resources from the outside world (alternatively,
by simply exaggerating it). We show that the Walrasian rule is not
\borrowing-proof" even on standard domains. More seriously, no e±-
cient selection from the endowments-lower-bound correspondence, or
from the no-envy-in-trades correspondence, or from the egalitarian-
equivalent-in-trades correspondence is borrowing-proof. These impos-
sibilities hold even on the domain of economies with homothetic pref-
erences.




Allocation rules can often be manipulated by agents misrepresenting their
preferences and a large literature has been devoted to understanding this
phenomenon. An agent can also bene¯t by manipulating the resources he
controls. It is well-known for instance that the Walrasian rule is not im-
mune to manipulation through \withholding" (Postlewaite, 1979; Thomson,
1987a): by withholding some of his endowment prior to the operation of the
rule, and after adding the resources he withheld to the consumption bundle
that the rule assigns to him, an agent may end up better o® than if he had
not withheld. For this rule, an agent may even gain by destroying some of
his endowment (Aumann and Peleg, 1974; Hurwicz, 1972, 1978).
We consider here another form of manipulation. Suppose that prior to
the operation of the chosen rule, an agent borrows resources to enlarge his
endowment. The rule is then applied, the agent receives his assigned con-
sumption bundle, and returns what he had borrowed. The end result may be
a bundle that he prefers to the one that he would have been assigned had he
not borrowed. Our objective is to study the requirement on a rule that it not
be subject to this kind of manipulation. We call it \borrowing-proofness".
The relevance of this property is to situations where certain agents may
have access to outside resources. Think of a trader operating on di®erent
markets and attempting to exploit arbitrage opportunities. The network lit-
erature is concerned with situations of this type, where agents are di®erently
connected, its goal being to understand the advantage (or disadvantage) con-
ferred to an agent by the speci¯c location he occupies in the network (Jackson
and Wolinsky, 1996). Here, we do not explicitly model the network but we
can think of an agent trading on one market but being linked to another
where he can borrow. Alternatively, we can think of an agent simply exag-
gerating his endowment.
We investigate the implications of borrowing-proofness in the context of
exchange economies. In a companion paper (Thomson, 2005), we study it
for public good economies.
As is the case for the other forms of manipulation enumerated above, the
reason to be concerned with borrowing is that it will de°ect the rule from
the allocations that it is supposed to achieve, thereby preventing society from
achieving its objectives.
Ours is not a model of an inter-temporal monetary economy; there are of
course no reason to be concerned with borrowing in situations when borrow-
1ing is an instrument to reach inter-temporal e±ciency.
Obviously, the rule that assigns to each economy its endowment pro¯le
is borrowing-proof. However, it fails e±ciency. The rule that assigns to a
particular agent, chosen once and for all, the sum of the individual endow-
ments, is borrowing-proof too. It is e±cient as well but this rule ignores
initial ownership of resources and therefore violates the participation con-
straints associated with ownership (as commonly interpreted, owning a good
comes with the right to use it in any way one wishes). It also violates all of
the basic notions of fairness in redistribution that have been proposed in the
literature.
The Walrasian rule is e±cient and it does recognize individual endow-
ments by always selecting allocations that satisfy most of the requirements
of participation and fairness in redistribution to which we just alluded. How-
ever, as we show ¯rst by means of examples, it is not borrowing-proof. This
is hardly surprising given what we know of this rule concerning a range of
properties of this kind. It violates virtually all of them, even on relatively
narrow domains of economies, including domains on which one would hope
that things would work out better.1
We then ask whether this negative result is speci¯c to the Walrasian rule.
We consider classes of rules satisfying e±ciency and one of several require-
ments of participation and fairness in redistribution. One is the \individual
endowments lower bound", which says that each agent should ¯nd his net
trade at least as desirable as no trade. The other is \no-envy in trades", which
says that no agent should prefer the net trade of anyone else to his own (Foley,
1967; Schmeidler and Vind, 1972). The third one is \egalitarian-equivalence
in trades" (adapted from a notion proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978,
for the problem of dividing a social endowment on which agents have equal
rights), which says that there should be a \reference trade" that each agent
¯nds indi®erent to his own trade.
1In addition to its unsatisfactory response to the various ways in which endowments can
change, documented above, when applied to the problem of fair division, it also does not
satisfy elementary fairness conditions that one might have hope for. In particular, it is not
resource monotonic (Thomson, 1978), that is, when the social endowment increases, some
agents may end up worse o®. It is not population monotonic (Thomson, 1983; Chichilnisky
and Thomson, 1987), that is, when population decreases, some of the remaining agents
may end up worse o®. It does not satisfy welfare domination under preference replacement
(Thomson, 1996), that is, when the preferences of some agents change, the welfares of the
others may be a®ected in di®erent directions. The study of properties of this type for
bargaining solutions is carried out by Chun and Thomson (1988).
2Our main results are negative. They state the incompatibility with e±-
ciency and any one of these requirements, of borrowing-proofness.
In practice, there are bounds on how much an agent can borrow: lenders
require collateral. If the manipulation is interpreted as exaggeration, there
are also bounds on what an agent can pretend to own for his exaggeration
to be credible. Thus, one should ask what happens if bounds are placed on
the augmentation. The answer is that our results still hold. Indeed, in our
proofs, we ¯x the initial pro¯le of endowments, and for each ¯ > 0, no matter
how small, we show that preferences can be speci¯ed so that one of the agents
can bene¯t by borrowing ¯ units of a good. Thus, no matter how small is
the amount he is allowed to borrow in relation to his initial holdings, he can
still gain by so doing. (Obviously however, the less an agent can borrow, the
less he can gain by manipulating).
General results exist stating for private good economies the incompati-
bility with e±ciency and the distributional requirements listed above, of the
requirement of non-manipulability through withholding (Postlewaite, 1979;
Thomson, 1987a. Results of the same kind are also available for public good
economies, Thomson, 1987b, and for economies with indivisible goods, Atla-
maz and Klaus, 2007). The results presented here can be seen as complemen-
tary. Although one should not be as concerned with manipulation through
borrowing as with manipulation through withholding, since the former re-
quires agents to have access to external resources, whereas the former can
be carried out on one's own, our results are nevertheless disappointing, all
the more so that they hold on classes of otherwise well-behaved economies.
Indeed, the proofs, which are by way of counterexamples, involve only two
goods and two agents whose preferences are continuous, monotone, convex,
and even homothetic. It is natural to expect that su±ciently strong addi-
tional restrictions on preferences would lead to more satisfactory conclusions.
Identifying such restrictions appears to be an interesting direction for future
research.
We raise other questions in the concluding section, where we also discuss
variants of our main de¯nitions. Travelling down the path opened by the
literature on strategy-proofness, which began with a study of misrepresen-
tation of preferences by a single agent, the ¯rst step we take here concerns
manipulation by a single agent too. In a second step, it will be important
to consider coordinated manipulation by several agents. We identify several
forms that such manipulation could take (borrowing by several agents; bor-
rowing from a fellow trader; more generally, transferring resources between
3traders).
2 Notation and de¯nitions
The model of private good allocation that we study is standard. There are
` 2 N goods and n 2 N agents. Let N ´ f1;:::;ng be the set of agents.
Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a preference relation on R`
+, denoted
by Ri. Let Pi denote the strict preference relation associated with Ri and
Ii the corresponding indi®erence relation. Let R be a domain of admis-
sible preferences, R ´ (R1;:::;Rn) 2 RN being a generic pro¯le of such
preferences. Each agent i 2 N is endowed with a vector of goods !i 2 R`
+,
! ´ (!1;:::;!n) 2 R`N
+ being a generic pro¯le of individual endowments. An






be the feasible set of (R;!). Let E be a domain of economies. Let Ecl be the
domain of economies in which preferences satisfy the classical assumptions
of continuity, monotonicity, and convexity.2;3 An economy is quasi-linear
if in addition to the classical assumptions, for each agent, indi®erence be-
tween two bundles is preserved by adding to them the same amount of a
particular good (we take it to be good 1). It is homothetic if in addition to
the classical assumptions, for each agent, indi®erence between two bundles
is preserved by multiplying them by the same positive number. Let Rq and
Rh be the class of quasi-linear and homothetic preferences respectively, and
Eq and Eh be the corresponding domains of economies.
Given a domain E of economies, a correspondence on E is a mapping
' associating with each (R;!) 2 E a non-empty subset of Z(!), denoted
'(R;!). We use the term rule when the mapping is single-valued. We apply
the phrase essentially single-valued to a correspondence ' such that for
each (R;!) 2 E, each pair fz;z0g µ '(R;!), and each i 2 N, zi Ii z0
i.4
A single-valued rule that always selects among the allocations chosen by a
particular correspondence is a selection from that correspondence. The
Pareto correspondence, P, associates with each economy each allocation
such that there is no other allocation that each agent ¯nds at least as de-
sirable, and at least one agent prefers: P(R;!) ´ fz 2 Z(!): there is no
2Vector inequalities: given a;b 2 R`, a = b means that for each k 2 f1;:::;`g, ak ¸ bk;
a ¸ b means that a = b and a 6= b; a > b means that for each k, ak > bk.
3The relation Ri is \monotonic" if for each fzi;z0
ig ½ R`
+ with z0
i > zi, z0
i Pi zi.
4We could also speak of a rule being single-valued up to Pareto-indi®erence.
4z0 2 Z(!) such that for each i 2 N, z0
i Ri zi, and for at least one i 2 N,
z0
i Pi zig.
We consider selections from the intersection of the Pareto correspondence
with the correspondences that are the most widely discussed in the litera-
ture. The individual-endowments lower bound correspondence5, B,
associates with each economy each allocation that each agent ¯nds at least
as desirable as his endowment: B(R;!) ´ fz 2 Z(!): for each i 2 N,
zi Ri !ig. The no-envy-in-trades correspondence, F, (Kolm, 1972;
Schmeidler and Vind, 1972) associates with each economy each allocation
obtained from the endowment pro¯le through a pro¯le of envy-free trades:
F(R;!) ´ fz 2 Z(!):z = !+t, where t ´ (ti)i2N 2 R`N is such that there is
no fi;jg µ N for which (!i + tj) Pi zig. The egalitarian-equivalence-in-
trades correspondence, E, (adapted from a notion proposed by Pazner
and Schmeidler, 1978, for the fair division problem) associates with each
economy each allocation obtained through a trade pro¯le for which there
is a \reference" trade that each agent ¯nds indi®erent to his component
of the pro¯le: E(R;!) ´ fz 2 Z(!): there is t0 2 R` such that for each
i 2 N, zi Ii (!i + t0)g. The Walrasian correspondence, W, asso-
ciates with each economy each allocation that can be \supported" by prices:
W(R;!) ´ fz 2 Z(!): there is p 2 ¢`¡1 such that for each i 2 N, pzi · p!i,
and for each z0
i 2 R`
+ such that pz0
i · p!i, we have zi Ri z0
ig. Agent i's o®er
curve from endowment !i is the locus of the maximizer of his preferences
on his budget set fyi 2 R`
+:pyi · p!ig as prices p vary. We denote this
o®er curve by oc(Ri;!i) (in the ¯gures, we use the more compact notation
oc(!i)).
The notation ¾(A;B) designates the symmetric image of object A with
respect to object B. Object A is a point or a set, and object B is a point or a
straight line. The intersection of two solutions ' and '0 is denoted by ''0. If
' is a subcorrespondence of '0, we write ' µ '0. Given a correspondence '
and i 2 N, 'i is the projection of ' onto agent i's consumption space:
'i(R;!) ´ fa 2 R`
+: there is z 2 '(R;!) such that zi = ag. Let ¤ designate
the 45± line and ¢`¡1 the (` ¡ 1)-dimensional simplex. Given zi 2 R`
+ n
f0g, ½(zi) is the ray emanating from the origin and passing through zi.
In an Edgeworth box diagram, there are two origins and to indicate the
one from which a ray emanates, we add an extra argument: ½(0i;z) is
the ray emanating from agent i's origin 0i and passing through z. In the
5It is usually called the individual rationality correspondence.
5¯gures, a small segment centered at a point zi indicates a line of support to
agent i's indi®erence curve through zi. The slope of that line is indicated in
parentheses next to this segment. The line of slope s passing through the
point a 2 R2
+ is denoted line(s;a). Given a list such as ! ´ (!i)i2N, we
designate by !¡i the sublist obtained by deleting the i-th component.
3 The results
Next is a formal statement of our requirement of immunity to manipulation
through borrowing. Although we could write it for correspondences, we will
work with allocation rules. (Recall that by this term we mean a mapping
that selects a single allocation for each economy.) This is to avoid the dif-
¯culty with strategic analysis in situations when to a pro¯le of strategies is
associated a set of outcomes, as opposed to a single outcome. Indeed, the
issue arises then of specifying how an agent bases his choice of a strategy on
comparisons of sets.6
Borrowing-proofness: For each e ´ (R;!) 2 EN, each i 2 N, and each !0 2
R`N
+ , if !0
i ¸ !i and !0
¡i = !¡i, then it is not the case that ('i(R;!0)¡(!0
i ¡
!i)) Pi 'i(R;!).
We formulate the property in a negative way because, for an arbitrary
vector of borrowed resources, the di®erence between what the rule assigns to
the agent who borrowed and the vector of resources he borrowed may not be
a non-negative vector. Of course, an agent would want to borrow only if he
can eventually return what he borrowed.
We investigate the existence of well-behaved rules de¯ned over domains of
economies with an arbitrary number of commodities and agents, but we es-
tablish our general negative results by way of examples with two commodities
and two agents. In these examples, preferences are continuous, monotonic,
and convex and in fact, homothetic. Operating under this additional require-
ment makes the construction more di±cult in some respects but it helps in
other ways because the Pareto e±cient set has a simpler structure then. If in
6One could allow for essential single-valuedness, but Pareto-indi®erence of the alloca-
tions chosen for the reported pro¯le of endowments would not necessarily imply the same
property after the amounts borrowed have been returned. Thus, the problem of specifying
how an agent compare sets of allocations would still have to be faced. A recent study of
manipulation of correspondences is Ching and Zhou (2002).
6addition preferences are strictly convex, it is a curve connecting the origins
of the Edgeworth box satisfying a certain monotonicity property.7 Thus, its
projection onto the consumption space of either agent is a curve having the
origin of that agent's consumption space and the aggregate endowment vec-
tor as endpoints, and this curve also satis¯es this monotonicity property. In
the proof of Theorem 2, we exploit a slightly weaker property of Pareto sets
for convex, but not necessarily strictly convex, preferences. This property is
stated as Observation 3.
We specify the examples geometrically, introducing them in such a way
as to make as intuitive as possible how we arrived at them. We do not
give explicit analytical expressions for representations of preferences. Such
expressions would not shed any additional light on the nature of the re-
sults. Geometric proofs are unavoidable because the distributional criteria
we consider cannot be checked on the basis of local information. Assuming
di®erentiability of preferences and examining marginal rates of substitution
at various consumption bundles would not help. However, the examples can
be easily adapted so as to satisfy this property. Preferences can also be made
strictly convex and strictly monotone if desired.
First are examples showing that on two standard domains, the Walrasian
rule violates borrowing-proofness. These examples are illustrated in Edge-
worth boxes. We adopt the following notational and graphical conventions.
We start from some endowment pro¯le and imagine agent 1 augmenting his
endowment by borrowing. The vector of resources he borrows is of the form
(¯;0) or (0;¯) for some ¯ > 0. To accommodate the resulting increase in
the aggregate endowment, we construct a larger Edgeworth box, keeping
agent 1's origin ¯xed and translating agent 2's origin 02 by the vector of
borrowed resources, to the point marked 00
2. Redrawn from this new origin,
we denote agent 2's preference map by R0
2.
Example 1 On the quasi-linear domain, the Walrasian rule is not borrowing-
proof. The example is illustrated in Figure 1a. We choose an arbitrary en-
dowment pro¯le !, a slope s < 0, and an allocation z 2 line(s;!) such
that z11 < !11. Let ¯ > 0. Agent 1 borrows the vector (0;¯). Let
!0
1 ´ !1 + (0;¯), !0
2 ´ !2, and !0 ´ (!0
1;!0
2). We choose s0 < s and an
allocation z0 2 line(s0;!0) such that z12 < z0
12 < z12+¯. Thus, z0
1¡(0;¯) lies
above line(s;!).


































































Figure 1: The Walrasian rule is not borrowing-proof. (a) The rule violates
the property on the quasi-linear domain (Example 1). (b) It also violates the
property on the homothetic domain (Example 2).
Next, we show that preferences R 2 RN
q can be speci¯ed so that z =
W(R;!) (with a line of support of slope s), z0 = W(R;!0) (with a line
of support of slope s0), and (z0
1 ¡ (0;¯)) P1 z1, in violation of borrowing-
proofness. Since R 2 RN
q , at any point above the horizontal line through z,
agent 1's indi®erence curve should have a line of support whose slope is
smaller than s (slopes are measured algebraically, so this means that the line
of support is steeper). Moreover, in the augmented Edgeworth box, at any
point below the horizontal line through z + ±, where ± ´ ((0;¯);(0;0)) (the
bundle z2 measured from 00
2 is the second component of the point marked
z +±), agent 2's indi®erence curve should have a line of support whose slope
is also smaller than s. A relation R1 2 Rq exists for which (i) z1 is a
maximizer on line(s;!), (ii) z0
1 is a maximizer of R1 on line(s0;!0), and (iii)
agent 1's indi®erence curve through z passes below z0 ¡ ±. Then indeed,
(z0
1 ¡ (0;¯)) P1 z1. Similarly, a relation R2 2 Rq exists for which (i) z2 is a
maximizer of R2 on line(s;!) in the original Edgeworth box, so that in the
augmented Edgeworth box, the second component of z + ±, which is z2, is
a maximizer on line(s;!0), and (ii) in the augmented Edgeworth box, z0
2 is
a maximizer on line(s0;!0). Preferences can be speci¯ed so as to guarantee
uniqueness of the Walrasian allocation.
8In Example 1, at the initial Walrasian allocation, agent 1 sells good 1
and buys good 2, and it is by borrowing good 2 that he manages to improve
his welfare. This seems to be the intuitively correct way to attempt to
manipulate the rule. Indeed, by so doing, he may bring about a decrease
in the price of this good, which should be to his advantage. It may be
interesting to ask what would happen if he borrowed good 1, the \wrong"
good, that is, the good that he sells. As shown next, on the quasi-linear
domain, he cannot gain by so doing. This observation, as well as a parallel
one below pertaining to the homothetic domain, should help us understand
the scope of the problem, and how it interacts with the speci¯cation of the
domain of preferences.
Observation 1 On the quasi-linear domain, the Walrasian rule cannot be
manipulated by an agent borrowing the good that he sells initially. Two cases
should be distinguished. If the initial Walrasian allocation is interior, it
remains so after the change in agent 1's endowment, the same prices remain
equilibrium prices, and agent 1's ¯nal bundle remains the same. If the initial
Walrasian allocation is a boundary allocation, his borrowing good 1 can only
make equilibrium prices move against him. In fact, he will be unable to
return what he borrowed. For agent 2, his ¯nal bundle is invariant under
borrowing of good 1, irrespective of whether the initial Walrasian allocation
is interior or not.
Next, we turn to the case of homothetic preferences.
Example 2 On the homothetic domain, the Walrasian rule is not borrowing-
proof. The example is illustrated in Figure 1b. We choose an arbitrary
endowment pro¯le !, a slope s < 0, and an allocation z 2 line(s;!) such
that z11 < !11. Let ¯ > 0. Agent 1 borrows (¯;0). Let !0
1 ´ !1 + (¯;0),
!0
2 ´ !2, and !0 ´ (!0
1;!0
2). We identify the triangle de¯ned by ½(01;z),
½(00
2;z + ±), where ± ´ ((¯;0);(0;0)), and line(s;!0). (It is shaded in the
¯gure.) We choose s0 < s so that line(s0;!0) has a non-degenerate segment
of intersection with this triangle. Let z0 be a point in the relative interior of
this segment.
Next, we show that preferences R 2 RN
h can be speci¯ed so that z =
W(R;!), z0 = W(R;!0), and (z0
1 ¡ (¯;0)) P1 z1, in violation of borrowing-
proofness. Since R1 2 Rh, at any point above ½(01;z), agent 1's indi®erence
curve through that point should have a line of support whose slope is smaller
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Figure 2: Observation 2. If the endowment pro¯le is !, at equilibrium, agent 1
sells good 1 in exchange for good 2. The two o®er curves from the point !0 obtained
when agent 1 borrows ¯ units of good 1, cross below line(s;!). Thus, agent 1 is
not made better o®.
±), agent 2's indi®erence curve through that point should have a line of
support whose slope is also smaller than s. A relation R1 2 Rh exists for
which (i) z1 is a maximizer on line(s;!), (ii) z0
1 is a maximizer on line(s0;!0),
and (iii) below ½(01;z), agent 1's indi®erence curve through z is su±ciently
close to line(s;!) that (z0
1¡(0;¯)) P1 z1. Similarly, a relation R2 2 Rh exists
for which (i) z2 is a maximizer of R2 on line(s;!) in the original Edgeworth
box, so that in the augmented Edgeworth box, the second component of
z + ±, which is z2, is a maximizer on line(s;!0), and (ii) in the augmented
Edgeworth box, z0
2 is a maximizer on line(s0;!0). Preferences can be speci¯ed
so as to guarantee uniqueness of the Walrasian allocation.
As on the quasi-linear domain, the Walrasian rule cannot be manipulated
by borrowing the \wrong" good.
Observation 2 On the homothetic domain, the Walrasian rule cannot be
manipulated by an agent borrowing the good that he sells initially. The proof
is illustrated in Figure 2. Let (R;!) 2 EN, z ´ W(R;!), with a supporting
price line of slope s. At z, agent 1 sells good 1 in exchange for good 2. Let
then have him borrow the vector (¯;0). Let !0
1 ´ !1 + (¯;0), !0
2 ´ !2,
and !0 ´ (!0
1;!0
2). Since R1 2 Rh, agent 1's o®er curve from !0
1 passes
through the point a on line(s;!0
1) that is proportional to z1. The bundle z2
measured from 02 is the second component of the allocation marked z0. It is
the maximizer of R0
2 on line(s;!0). Thus, in the augmented Edgeworth box,
10agent 2's o®er curve from !0
2 passes through z0




2. Thus, the two agents' o®er curves from !0 cross
below that line, at the point marked ~ z. This implies that ~ z1 ¡(¯;0) is below
line(s;z). Agent 1 is worse o® than if he had not borrowed.
We now turn to a general investigation of the implications of borrowing-
proofness, requiring of rules that they should be e±cient and satisfy one
or the other of the various distributional requirements de¯ned earlier. We
begin with no-envy in trades and the individual-endowments lower bound.
The following theorem covers both.
Theorem 1 On the classical domain, no selection from the no-envy-in-trades
and Pareto solution, nor from the individual-endowments lower bound and
Pareto solution, is borrowing-proof.
We will use the following observation.
Observation 3 In an Edgeworth box economy with homothetic preferences,
if an allocation z that di®ers from either origin is e±cient and has no Pareto-
indi®erent allocation, the entire Pareto set lies in the bow-tie{shaped area
de¯ned by the rays through z emanating from the two origins.
The notation bt(z) designates the bow-tie{shaped area associated with z = 2
f01;02g.
Proof: Let (R;!) 2 EN
h and z 2 P(R;!), and suppose that z = 2 f01;02g.
Let s be the slope of a line of support to z. Let z0 2 P(R;!)nbt(z). Without
loss of generality, suppose that z0 lies above both ½(01;z) and ½(02;z). Let s0
be the slope of a line of support to z0. Since z0 is above ½(01;z), s0 ¸ s, and
since z0 is above ½(02;z), s0 · s. Thus s = s0. This implies that at each point
between ½(01;z) and ½(01;z0), agent 1's indi®erence curve through it admits
a line of support of slope s, and at each point between ½(02;z) and ½(02;z0),
agent 2's indi®erence curve through it admits a line of support of slope s.
Let a ´ ½(01;z)\line(s;z) and b ´ ½(02;z)\line(s;z). Note that a 6= z and
b 6= z. Of a and b, let c designate the closest to z. Thus, each allocation in
seg[z;c] is in P(R;!) with a line of support of slope s. Any such allocation
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Figure 3: Theorem 1. Describing the economy. The requirements imposed
on R1 are extracted from this ¯gure and reproduced in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows
how to construct R1 that satis¯es them.
12Proof: (a) The proof of the ¯rst statement is by means of an example,
illustrated in Figures 3-5, of a two-good, two-agent economy in which the
two agents have homothetic preferences that are symmetric of each other
with respect to the 45± line (that is, for each pair fz1;z0
1g ½ R2
+, if z1 I1 z0
1,
then ¾(z1;¤) I2 ¾(z0
1;¤)). Most of the proof consists in constructing one of
agent 1's indi®erence curves. This curve is denoted I. The speci¯cation of
R1 is completed by subjecting I to homothetic transformations. Agent 2's
preferences R2 are obtained from R1 by symmetry with respect to ¤.
Step 1: Constructing the economy. Let !1 = !2 2 ¤. Let ¯ > 0.
Agent 1 borrows ¯ units of good 1. Let !0
1 ´ !1 + (¯;0), !0




Let ¹ z1 ´ line(¡1;!1) \ ½(!0
1), ¹ z2 ´ !1 + !2 ¡ ¹ z1, and ¹ z ´ (¹ z1; ¹ z2). Let
` ´ ¹ z11 ¡ !11, a the point of intersection of the vertical line of abscissa
!0
11 ¡ ` with ½(!0
1) (= ½(¹ z1)) (a is further from the origin along this ray
than ¹ z1), and x1 be a point of abscissa !0
11 + ` and ordinate in ]¹ z12;a2[. The
indi®erence curve I we specify for agent 1 is his indi®erence curve through x1
and we reproduce on Figure 4 the requirements we impose on I except for
one. Our objective is (i) to make ¹ z1 the maximizer of R1 on line(¡1;!1),
and (ii) to make x1 the bundle of FP(R;!0) that agent 1 likes the least.
For the e±ciency part of (ii) to hold, I and agent 2's indi®erence curve
through x2 ´ !0
1 + !2 ¡ x1 should have parallel lines of support at x1 and
x2 respectively. For the fairness part of (ii) to hold (for x to be the worst
allocation in FP(R;!0) for agent 1), I should pass through ¾(x1;!0
1). Let s
be the slope of seg[a;x1]. By the choice of x1 and a, we have s > ¡1. We give
I a line of support of slope s at x1. Thus, agent 2's indi®erence curve through
x2 also has a line of support of slope s at x2. By the symmetry of preferences,
agent 1's indi®erence curve through ¾(x2;¤) has a line of support of slope
1
s at that point. Since x21 = ¹ z21 and x22 < ¹ z22, then ¾1(x2;¤) < ¹ z11 and
¾2(x2;¤) = ¹ z12, and therefore ¾(x2;¤) is above ½(¹ z1). Also, since s > ¡1,
1
s < ¡1. Since x1 is below ½(¹ z1), then ¾(x1;!0
1) is above ½(¹ z1). Let b be the
point of intersection of line(1
s;¾(x1;!0
1)) with ½(¹ z1). Since a1 = ¾1(x1;!0
1),
then b is further from the origin along ½(¹ z1) than a. Let c be the point of
intersection of line(¡1;b) with the line passing through a and x1. Observe
that c 2 seg[a;x1].
We now de¯ne I satisfying all of the requirements listed so far (Figure 5).
We take I to be the union of the following three segments: the extension
to the vertical axis of seg[b;¾(x1;!0
















Figure 4: Theorem 1. Listing the requirements imposed on R1. The
map R1 has to satisfy three slope requirements, along ½(¹ z1), ½(x1), and ½(¾(x2;¤)).
Also, the indi®erence curve through x1 should pass through ¾(x1;!0
1). A ¯nal re-
quirement (not indicated) is that x1 be the only point at which line(s;x1) supports
the indi®erence curve passing through x1, and that ¹ z1 be the only point at which
line(¡1; ¹ z1) supports the indi®erence curve passing through ¹ z1.
horizontal axis of seg[c;x1]. Since ½(¾(x2;¤) is steeper than ½(¹ z1), which itself
is steeper than ½(x1), and the slopes of the lines of support along these three
rays, of slopes 1
s, ¡1, and s respectively, are ordered in the same manner,
the curve I is indeed the indi®erence curve of a convex relation.
It follows from our construction so far that ¹ z 2 P(R;!) and x 2 P(R;!0).
The remaining requirement that we impose on agent 1's preferences is there
to guarantee that in (R;!), no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to ¹ z, and
that in (R;!0) no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to x. Let " > 0 and c" ´
line(¡1 + ";b) \ line(s ¡ ";x1). We replace the curve I of the previous
paragraph by the union of the extension to the vertical axis of seg[b;¾(x1;!0
1)]
(as before), seg[b;c"], seg[c";x1], and the extension to the horizontal axis of
the segment with left endpoint x1 that has slope s+" (Figure 5). For " small
enough, this (piece-wise linear in four pieces) curve is indeed the indi®erence
curve of a convex relation.
Step 2: Concluding. Let ' 2 FP and z ´ '(R;!). Since ¹ z 2 P(R;!) and
' 2 P, then either ¹ z1 R1 z1 or ¹ z2 R2 z2. By the symmetry of the preferences
and the equality !1 = !2, we can assume, without loss of generality, that
the former statement holds. Let z0 ´ '(R;!0). By (ii), z0


































Figure 5: Theorem 1. Constructing a map R1 satisfying all the require-
ments. A typical indi®erence curve is an approximation to the piece-wise linear
curve in three pieces denoted I. The approximation is shown in the enlarged box
close to the origin as a dotted broken line. The steep segment emanating from b is
kept as such. The segment seg[b;c] is rotated slightly counterclockwise around b.
The segment seg[c;x1] is rotated slightly clockwise around x1. The segment em-
anating from x1 to the right of x1 is rotated slightly counterclockwise around x1.
15line(¡1;!1) supports agent 1's indi®erence curve through ¹ z1 at that point and
¹ z1 is the only point of contact of that line with that indi®erence curve, and
line(¡1;!2) supports agent 2's upper indi®erence curve at ¹ z2. Thus, not only
¹ z 2 P(R;!) but in (R;!), no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to ¹ z. Then, by
Observation 3, the projection of P(R;!) onto agent 1's consumption space
(that is, the consumptions for agent 1 that are the ¯rst component of an
e±cient allocation in (R;!)) is contained in the projection of bt(z). Also,
line(s;x1) supports agent 1's indi®erence curve through x1 at that point and
x1 is the only point of contact of that line with that indi®erence curve, and
line(s;x2) supports agent 2's indi®erence curve through x2. Thus, not only
x 2 P(R;!0) but in (R;!0), no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to x. Thus, by
Observation 3, the projection of P(R;!0) onto agent 1's consumption space
is contained in the projection of bt(z0). Thus, ¹ z1 ¸ z1 and z0
1 ¸ x1. Note
that for each a ¸ ¹ z1, a P1 ¹ z1. Altogether then, and since z0
1 ¡(¯;0) ¸ ¹ z1, we
obtain (z0
1 ¡ (¯;0)) P1 ¹ z1 R1 z1, in violation of borrowing-proofness.
(b) In the two-agent case, no-envy-in-trades is a weaker requirement than
the individual-endowments lower bound (Kolm, 1972; Thomson, 1987a).
Since we proved the negative result pertaining to no-envy by means of a
two-agent example, the result pertaining to the individual-endowments lower
bound follows as a corollary. ¤
Next, we consider egalitarian-equivalence and establish a parallel impos-
sibility to that of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 On the classical domain, no selection from the egalitarian-equivalence-
in-trades and Pareto solution is borrowing-proof.
We also prove Theorem 2 by means of a two-agent economy. Since
in the two-agent case, no-envy-in-trades implies egalitarian-equivalence-in-
trades (see Thomson, 1987a, for a proof), Theorem 2 implies Theorem 1.
We have chosen to also present the proof for no-envy-in-trades because it is
signi¯cantly simpler than the one for egalitarian-equivalence-in-trades. We
relegate the latter proof to the appendix. Here is an informal explanation of
where the complications come from.
In either case, we need to identify for the borrower (agent 1) the low-
est indi®erence curve that contains a bundle that may be his component
of an e±cient allocation that meets the stated distributional requirement,
no-envy-in-trades in one case, egalitarian-equivalence-in-trades in the other.
16For no-envy-in-trades, this worst bundle is simply such that agent 1 is in-
di®erent between his trade and agent 2's trade. To verify this property,
agent 2's indi®erence curve through his own bundle need not be constructed.
For egalitarian-equivalence-in-trades, this worst bundle|let call it x1|is
such that agent 2's indi®erence curve through his own bundle|let us call
it x2|when translated by agent 1's trade, lies above agent 1's indi®erence
curve through x1. To verify this property, agent 2's entire indi®erence curve
through x2 has to be constructed (and translated), but since the two prefer-
ence relations are symmetric of each other with respect to the 45± line, they
cannot be drawn independently of each other: they have to be constructed
together.
4 Concluding comments
We conclude with a discussion of the relation between borrowing and with-
holding, and of variants of our main requirement.
1. Borrowing versus withholding. It is natural to ask whether the vul-
nerability of an allocation rule to borrowing is related to its vulnerability to
withholding. These two behaviors have a strong resemblance, but it is not
obvious how to formally relate them and in fact, results obtained on other
domains, such as domains of public good economies (Thomson, 2005, 2008)
suggest fundamental di®erences. Intuitively, if an agent is likely to bene¯t
by a®ecting the scarcity of the goods that he acquires from his fellow traders
relative to that of the goods that he provides to them, the circumstances in
which he bene¯ts from borrowing a particular good seem to be precisely ones
in which he would not bene¯t from withholding the good.
Both withholding and borrowing have the e®ect in bringing the trades
that an agent will be required to engage in from one region of his consump-
tion space to another region where his preferences \look di®erent". In that
way, the two properties essentially amount to a misrepresentation of pref-
erences. The main di®erence between misrepresenting preferences and mis-
representing endowments is that for the former, a strategic agent has access
to any relation satisfying the maintained assumptions on preferences, but
for the latter, he only has access to maps that are derived from a single
\mother map" (his true map). Furthermore, when distributional require-
ments are imposed on the possible trades of the other agents, the di®erence
between withholding and borrowing is that by withholding, an agent gains
17access to submaps that are closer to the origin, whereas in the second case,
he gains access to submaps that are further from the origin. Thus, and be-
cause the range of submaps obtainable by the former strategy seems to be
more limited than the range of submaps obtainable by the latter strategy,
one would think that opportunities to gain by borrowing dominate oppor-
tunities to gain by withholding. This is not true however when preferences
are restricted, by quasi-linearity or homotheticity for example, as we have
assumed. Indeed, what preferences look like below the endowment and what
they look like above the endowment are related. For instance, homotheticity
implies that indi®erence curves are less curvy above the endowment than
below. To compare the possible bene¯t from withholding to the possible
bene¯t from borrowing, one needs to understand whether it is useful to have
access to more curvy preferences or to less curvy ones. Of course, this should
in general depend on the rule that is being used. To illustrate, if the rule is
the Walrasian rule, then by borrowing su±ciently large amounts, an agent
with Cobb-Douglas preferences can make it appear that he has almost linear
preferences whose indi®erence curves have any slope that he chooses. These
informal observations may provide some intuition about the di®erential im-
pact of these two kinds of strategies.
2. Borrowing by groups. One can imagine that agents get together in a
group, jointly borrow, and all end up better o®. Immunity to such behavior
could be called \group borrowing-proofness", a notion that is parallel to
the notion of \group strategy-proofness" that has been much studied in the
context of preference misrepresentation.
Furthermore, even if a group of agents has no joint borrowing strategy
that bene¯ts them all, it may be that after the rule is applied and each of
them has returned the resources he borrowed, transfers between them exist
that make them better o®.
Finally, one need not require that each agent returns exactly the resources
he borrowed. As long as the group as a whole returns the sum of the resources
its members borrowed, one may argue that it has ful¯lled its obligations. A
rule could conceivably be borrowing-proof but not immune to this type of
strategic behavior by groups. The analogy to manipulation through arbitrary
transfers of endowments between the members of a group should be noted
(see the considerable literature in international trade on the transfer paradox;
also Gale, 1974, and Aumann and Peleg, 1974; a recent contribution in the
context of economies with indivisible goods is Atlamaz and Klaus, 2007).
18We have mainly o®ered negative results, and matters are of course worse
when agents can engage in joint strategic choices of the types just described.
3. Open economy versus closed economy borrowing. In our formulation
of borrowing-proofness, we have assumed that an agent borrows \from the
outside world". Alternatively, we could imagine an agent borrowing from one
of his fellow traders. To guarantee the cooperation of an agent from whom he
borrows, this lender, after the resources he lent have been returned to him,
should be at least as well o® as he would have been if he had not lent. For an
e±cient rule, the option to so manipulate exists only if there are three agents
or more. We call a rule that is immune to this kind of manipulation \closed-
economy borrowing-proof" using the expression \open-economy borrowing-
proofness" for the property to which our theorems pertain. Behavior of
this type is akin to the various manipulations by groups enumerated in the
previous paragraphs in that it requires cooperation among several agents,
whereas in this paper, we have focused on strategic options that individual
agents have.
Alternatively, we need not insist that the agent who borrows returns the
exact bundle he borrows, but simply that he returns resources that guarantee
that the lender ends up at least as well o® as he would have been if he had
not lent.
Finally, we could also imagine that an agent who borrows does so from
more than one agent. Then, after he returns the resources he borrows, each
of the lenders should end up at least as well o® as he would have been if he
had not lent.
4. Other domains. In companion papers devoted to a study of borrowing-
proofness in economies in which public goods are present (Thomson, 2005;
2007), we have identi¯ed a number of situations in which a rule is borrowing-
proof but not withholding-proof, but found no situation where the reverse is
true. Atlamaz and Thomson (2005) conduct similar analyses for economies
with indivisible goods. Thus a picture of the relative restrictiveness of the
two requirements is slowly emerging.
5. What about Walras? We began by criticizing the Walrasian rule for its
various failings. However, the general negative results reported here, as well
as others, concerning for instance resource monotonicity (Moulin and Thom-
son, 1988), withholding-proofness (Postlewaite, 1979; Thomson, 1987a), pop-
ulation monotonicity (Kim, 2004), welfare domination under preference re-
placement (Thomson, 1996) can be understood as providing, if not an exon-
19eration of the Walrasian rule, at least compelling extenuating circumstances:
as soon as e±ciency and one or the other of basic distributional requirement
are imposed, we face an impossibility. Nevertheless, the main merits of the
rule have to do with its informational properties, in terms of dimensionality
of message spaces needed for its \realization" (Hurwicz, 1977), as well as its
robustness properties with respect to certain changes in population, such as
replication invariance and consistency (Thomson, 1988).
6. Manipulation and implementation. Once the problem with manipu-
lation of a rule is recognized, it is natural next to associate with it a ma-
nipulation game and to study its equilibria. A study of a Walrasian game
when strategies are announcements of endowments is Thomson (1979). The
next question is the implementation question. A seminal contribution to im-
plementation theory when endowments and production sets are unknown is
Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995).
Appendix
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2. It is convenient to explain ¯rst how
to obtain the endpoints of the set of e±cient allocations that are egalitarian-
equivalent-in-trades. To each pair (Ri;!i) 2 R £ R2
+ of a preference map
over consumption bundles and an individual endowment for agent i can be
associated a preference map over trades for him. Geometrically, the lat-
ter is obtained from the former by translation by ¡!i. An allocation z is
egalitarian-equivalent-in-trades for some economy (R;!) 2 EN if and only if
the various agents' indi®erence curves through their assigned bundles, when
translated as just explained, have one point in common. Alternatively, one
can use as origin one agent's endowment, say agent 1's, and translate the
preference map of each other agent i by the vector !1 ¡!i (so that agent i's
translated endowment coincides with !1). Then, z is egalitarian-equivalent-
in-trades for (R;!) 2 EN if and only if there is a particular point that, for
each i 2 N (including agent 1), agent i's indi®erence curve through his con-
sumption zi, when translated by the vector !1 ¡ !i, contains. We will apply
this observation to the two-agent case; then we need to translate the map
of only one agent, agent 2. In that case, for an allocation x to be, among
the egalitarian-equivalent-in-trades and e±cient allocations, one that is least
favorable to agent 1, agent 2's indi®erence curve through x2, translated by
!1 ¡ !2, should touch agent 1's indi®erence curve through x1 and should lie






























¾(¹ z1 + (¯;0);¤)
¹ z1 + (¯;0)
Figure 6: Theorem 2. Identifying critical points.
21Proof: (Figure 7) The proof is by means of an example of a two-good,
two-agent economy in which agents have homothetic preferences that are
symmetric of each other with respect to the 45± line. Most of the proof
consists in constructing one of agent 1's indi®erence curves. The curve we
construct is denoted I. The speci¯cation of R1 is completed by subjecting I
to homothetic transformations. Agent 2's preferences R2 are obtained from
R1 by symmetry with respect to ¤.
Step 1: Constructing the economy. Let !1 = !2 2 ¤. Let ¯ > 0.
Agent 1 borrows ¯ units of good 1. Let !0
1 ´ !1 + (¯;0), !0




The initial steps of the construction are illustrated in Figure 6. Let ¹ z1 ´
line(¡1;!1) \ ½(!0
1), ¹ z2 ´ !1 + !2 ¡ ¹ z1, and ¹ z ´ (¹ z1; ¹ z2). Let x1 be a point
of abscissa ¹ z11 + ¯ and ordinate ¹ z12 + °, where ° > 0 is chosen as follows.
Let x2 ´ !0
1 + !2 ¡ x1. We have x2 = ¹ z2 ¡ (0;°). Let a be the point
of ½(¹ z2) of ordinate x22. (In the ¯gure, the horizontal segment seg[a;x2]
is hard to distinguish from the longer segment passing through x2 because
this second segment, which will turn out to be part of agent 2's indi®erence
curve through x2, is almost horizontal. What is important to note is that
the abscissa of the leftmost point of that segment, the (unlabelled) point
where it meets ½(¹ z2), is greater than the abscissa of a. Let b ´ a + (¯;0).
Let c be the point of ½(¹ z1) (= ½(!0
1)) of abscissa b1. Let d be a point of
½(¹ z1) whose abscissa is in ]z11;c1[. Now, let ° decrease to 0. The following
occurs: lim°!0 x1 = ¹ z1 + (¯;0), lim°!0 x2 = ¹ z2, lim°!0 a = ¹ z2, lim°!0 b =
¾(¹ z1 + (¯;0);¤), and lim°!0 c1 = ¹ z21 + ¯. Since the slope of ½(¹ z1) is smaller
than ¡1, lim°!0 c2 is greater than lim°!0 x12. Thus, for ° small enough,
there is d such that d2 > x12. Let us choose ° and d in this manner.
We now specify agent 1's indi®erence curve I through x1 (Figure 7).
Our objective is (i) to make ¹ z1 the maximizer of R1 on line(¡1;!1), and
(ii) to make x1 the bundle of EP(R;!0) that agent 1 likes the least. For the
e±ciency part of (ii) to be met, I and agent 2's indi®erence curve through x2,
denoted J, should have parallel lines of support at x1 and x2 respectively.
Let Jt be obtained by translating J by the vector (¯;0) = !0
1 ¡ !2. For the
fairness part of (ii), (for x to be the point of EP(R;!0) that agent 1 likes the
least), I and Jt should touch, but otherwise, Jt should lie below I (see the
comment preceding this proof).
Let s be the slope of seg[d;x1]. We give I a line of support of slope s at x1.


















































Figure 7: Theorem 2. The preference map for agent 1 has to satisfy three
slope requirements, along ½(¹ z1), ½(x1), and ½(¾(x2;¤)). Moreover, his indi®erence
curve through x1, denoted I, should touch, but otherwise remain underneath, the
translate of agent 2's indi®erence curve through x2, J, by (¯;0) = !0
1 ¡ !2. This
translated curve is called Jt and ft is a point of contact of I and Jt. It is the
translate of f by the vector (¯;0).
23of slope s at x2. By the symmetry of preferences, agent 1's indi®erence
curve through ¾(x2;¤) has a line of support of slope 1
s at that point. Since
x21 = ¹ z21 and x22 < ¹ z22, then ¾1(x2;¤) < ¹ z11 and ¾2(x2;¤) = ¹ z12. Thus,
¾(x2;¤) is above ½(¹ z1). Also, since s > ¡1, then 1
s < ¡1. Let e be the point
of intersection of line(1
s;d) with ¤. We choose (iii) I to contain seg[d;e]
and (iv) to continue from e vertically. By the symmetry of preferences and
(iii), between ¤ and ½(¹ z2), J is a segment of slope s. By the symmetry
of preferences and (iv), below ¤, J is a horizontal half-line. Next, since I
contains seg[d;x1] whose slope is s, J continues upwards from its intersection
with ½(¹ z2) with a segment of slope 1
s. Let us extend this segment until the
point f whose translation by (¯;0) belongs to the vertical half-line through e
(recall that from (iv), this half-line is part of I). Let ft be the point of
minimal ordinate at which this extension and this half-line meet. Then,
f = ft ¡ (¯;0). Thus, J extends linearly from its intersection with ½(¹ z2)
to f and we choose it to continue vertically from f. We now complete the
speci¯cation of I. By the symmetry of the preferences, we have to extend
seg[d;x1] whose slope is s to the right until it meets ½(¾(f;¤))|let us call
g this point of intersection|and continue horizontally to the right from g.
It remains to show that s can be chosen so that ½(¾(f;¤)) passes below x1.
This is so because as s ! 0, ft
2 ! 1. Thus, for s close enough to 0, the ray
through f is arbitrarily close to being vertical, and its symmetric image with
respect to ¤ is arbitrarily close to being horizontal. Thus, for s close enough
to 0, this ray does pass below x1.
We now observe that I and Jt meet at ft (and at any point on the vertical
half-line emanating from ft). They do not meet anywhere else; indeed Jt lies
above the horizontal line of ordinate !12 whereas the part of I that extends
to the right of d is entirely below that line.
It follows from our construction so far that ¹ z 2 P(R;!) and x 2 P(R;!0).
The remaining requirement that we impose on agent 1's preferences is to
guarantee that in (R;!), no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to ¹ z, and that in
(R;!0), no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to x. For that purpose, we modify
the curve I de¯ned earlier. Let " > 0. Instead of choosing I to contain a
segment of slope s through x1, we choose it to contain a segment of slope
s ¡ " to the left of x1, its leftmost point d" being on ½(¹ z1), and a segment
of slope s + " to the right of x1. (How far this segment extends to the
right is determined below.) Above d"
1, I continues from d" as it continued
from d in the previous construction (with a segment of slope 1
s) until it
24meets ¤|let e" be this meeting point|followed by a vertical segment. By
the symmetry of the preferences, J still contains the segment of slope s that
extends from ¤ to ½(¹ z2). It has to continue upwards from its intersection
with ½(¹ z2) with a segment of slope 1
s¡" until it meets ¾(x1;¤). Let h" be
the point of intersection. Then, from h", it has to continue upwards with
a segment of slope 1
s+". Thus, Jt continues upwards from the translate of
h" by (¯;0) with a segment of slope 1
s¡" followed by a segment of slope 1
s+".
Let ft" be the intersection of the second segment with the vertical half-line
emanating from e", which is part of agent 1's indi®erence curve through x1.
Let f"
2 ´ f"t
2 ¡ (¯;0). The speci¯cation of I can now be completed. By
the symmetry of the preferences, we have to extend the segment of slope
s + " emanating from x1 until it meets ½(¾(f";¤)), and we have to extend I
horizontally to the right from ¾(f";¤). (Thus, as compared to our previous
construction, the ray through x1 is an additional ray of kinks for the map.)
Step 2: Concluding. Let ' 2 EP and z ´ '(R;!). Since ¹ z 2 P(R;!) and
' 2 P, then either ¹ z1 R1 z1 or ¹ z2 R2 z2. By the symmetry of the preferences
and because of the equality !1 = !2, we can assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that the former statement holds. Let z0 ´ '(R;!0). By (ii), z0
1 R1 x1.
Note that line(¡1; ¹ z1) supports agent 1's indi®erence curve through ¹ z1 at
that point and that ¹ z1 is the only point of contact of that line with that
indi®erence curve; also, line(¡1;!2) supports agent 2's indi®erence curve
at ¹ z2. Thus, not only ¹ z 2 P(R;!) but also in (R;!), no allocation is Pareto-
indi®erent to ¹ z. By Observation 3, the projection of P(R;!) onto agent 1's
consumption space is contained in bt(¹ z). Also, line(s; ¹ x1) supports agent 1's
indi®erence curve through x1 at that point and x1 is the only point of con-
tact of that line with that indi®erence curve; moreover, line(s;x2) supports
agent 2's indi®erence curve at x2. Thus, not only x 2 P(R;!0) but also
in (R;!0), no allocation is Pareto-indi®erent to x. Thus, by Observation 3,
the projection of P(R;!0) onto agent 1's consumption space is contained in
bt(x). Thus, z0
1 ¸ x1. Note that for each a ¸ ¹ z1, a P1 ¹ z1. Altogether then,
and since z0
1¡(!0
1¡!1) ¸ ¹ z1, we obtain (z0
1¡(¯;0)) P1 ¹ z1 R1 z1, in violation
of borrowing-proofness. ¤
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